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REAL CRIMES AND QUASI CRIMES
P. J.Fitzgerald
\

BETWEEN crimes like murder, assault, and theft on the one hand and on the

other hand offenses against modem statutory regulations concerning industry,
transport and other aspects of present-day life there seems to be a deep and
self-evident distinction. It is not simply that the former are more serious and
harmful than the latter, for this is not always the case. Nor is it simply that one
group is triable by a different procedure and punishable with higher penalties.
In England, at any rate, many offenses of both groups are triable either summarily or on indictment, and the penalties for some in the second group may
exceed those for some in the first; and in any case distinctions between procedure and penalties are purely artificial ones created by law. The real or natural
distinction is that enshrined in the well-known theory that crimes may be
classified into those which are mala in se and those which are mala prohibita
- a theory which, it is often said, was exploded a long time ago,' but which,
like an inveterate trouper, refuses to desert the stage. Arrayed in a new and
more fashionable costume, it is now trying to make a comeback with the support of Lord Devlin, who has argued that crimes such as murder and stealing
are real crimes, i.e., sins with legal definitions, while the other sort are quasi
crimes or technical offenses which, though possibly founded ultimately on
some moral basis, consist often of "fussy regulations whose breach it would
be pedantic to call immoral." 2 Indeed, the lack of moral content in much
of the quasi-criminal law can be seen from the law's lack of concern whether
or not the man charged is the actual wrongdoer, for this is a part of the
law where both strict and vicarious liability are prevalent.
Now this theory has an ancient lineage.3 Its origin it owes partly to
Aristotle 4 and the distinction which he drew between natural and conventional justice, and partly to a Judeo-Christian law conception of ethics. Blackstone, for instance, in language reminiscent of Antigone, 5 talks of mala in se

I See

Bensley v. Bignold (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 335, at 341; 106 Eng. Repts. 1214, at 1216.
Patrick Devlin, "Law and Morals" (Published by the Holdsworth Club of the Faculty of
Law, of the University of Birmingham, 1961), p. 3. Reprinted in DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 26-42 (1965).
3 See The Distinction between "Mala Prohibita" and "Mala in Se" in Criminal Law, 30
COLUMBIA LAw REVIEW 74 (1930).
4
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1134b.
5 SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 453-7.
2
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as "prohibited by superior laws and therefore contracting no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. ' 6 In the
hands of common law judges the distinction has served various purposes. It
7
served the political purpose of restricting the royal dispensing power. It
assisted the judges to develop the criminal law of homicide,8 the defenses of
mistake 9 and consent, 1 0 and it has not been without importance in certain
11
noncriminal areas of the law.
And now, when it has lost much of its support and fallen into comparative disrepute, Devlin suggests that this distinction should determine our
choice of procedure. 12 In view of the lack of moral content in quasi-criminal
crimes and in view of the fact that the force behind obedience to law is the
citizen's sense of obligation, he contends that we should avoid blurring the
distinction between the real criminal law and the quasi-criminal law just
as we should avoid jumbling morals and sanitary regulations together. Otherwise law and morals are set at odds with each other, the citizen becomes
distressed at seeing technical offenders treated as real criminals, and society
is confused into an inability to see the difference between illegality and
immorality. Eventually stealing may be considered as really no worse than
parking offenses - both being equally contrary to law - with the result
that law in general may lose its force. To avoid such consequences he suggests that only real crimes should be punishable with imprisonment while
technical offenses should be subject to some lesser kind of penalty; and,
secondly, that real crimes should be tried by juries, since these are particularly suitable for dealing with moral offenses, while technical offenses should

be tried by magistrates, since juries are not well equipped for dealing with
what are in effect offenses of discipline, because in such matters they naturally
tend to identify themselves with the accused.
Now clearly if such a distinction is made by common sense, no reasonable

legislator can afford to disregard it. To go further, however, and base upon
it a whole system of criminal procedure and punishment would be justified
only if common sense were right. To take an analogy, if most people regard
homosexual behavior as particularly vicious, then the law should perhaps
6 BLAcKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 42.

7 7 B. Mich. 11 Hen VIII f. 11 pl. 35 (1496); Godden v. Hales 6. St. T. 1165; Thomas
v. Sorrell, Vaugh. 330; 124 Eng. Repts. 1098.
s 1 Hale P.C. 475; FOSTER, CROWN LAW 259 (3rd ed.); cf. State v. Horton 139 N.C.
588, 51 S.E. 945 (1905).
9
See R. v. Prince, (1875) L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154; R. v. Tolson, (1889) 23 Q.B.D.
168.
'OR. v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498.
11 See Re Piper, [1946] 2 All E.R. 503, at 505; HANBURY, MODERN EQuITY 598 (8th
ed.) : "For crimes that are mala in se the injunction is inappropriate."
12Devlin, op. cit. supra note 2.
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take this into account; it should not, however, let the popularity of this belief
obscure the possibility of its falsity, for it may well turn out that homosexuals
cannot help their behavior and-stand in need of treatment rather than punishment. Or again if the greater part of society considers that only the death
penalty will suffice to deter murderers, then the legislator should pay heed
to this, but again without closing his mind to the possibility that evidence
may show the death penalty to have no unique deterrent effect. If popular
opinion were wrong about homosexuality and the death penalty, then the
legislator could hardly justify the retention of laws proscribing homosexuality
and prescribing capital punishment simply on the ground of public demand;
in such cases the legislature must lead rather than bow to public opinion.
Ultimately the question must be faced whether the commonsense distinction between these two sorts of crimes can be logically supported. The
purpose of this article is to examine some of the objections which may be
levelled against the theory and its usefulness. One objection is that there are
no such things as acts which are wrong in themselves. Another is that acts
forbidden by law can no longer be regarded as simply mala prohibita. A third
objection is that even if there are intrinsically wrong acts and even if indifferent
acts forbidden by law can be regarded as merely mala prohibita, nevertheless
this distinction has no practical use for the criminal law.

viEw that certain acts are intrinsically wrong is open to attack on two
different grounds. First it may be objected that the wrongness of an act is
never simply a matter of intrinsic quality but depends rather on the circumstances, the consequences, and the motives of the agent. A second objection
is that such a view commits us to the presupposition that objective truth in
morals is possible and that no such presupposition can be maintained.
Now the notion that acts are themselves morally indifferent and derive
their moral quality from motives, circumstances, and consequences conflicts
sharply with the commonsense view that certain actions, such as the deliberate
killing of an innocent person, are in some way intrinsically wrong. It also
conflicts with the traditional scholastic view that the primary determinant of
the moral character of an act is its object, which may be good, bad, or indifferent, and that circumstances and consequences are only secondary determinants which help to establish this character but which are not the sole
criteria. 13 On this view if the object of an act, i.e., the act itself as contrasted
with its circumstances or consequences, is morally evil, then no matter how
THE

13

ed., London, 1958);
17 (16th ed., Westminster, Md., 1955).

HENRY DAVIS, S.J., 1 MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOoY 54 (7th

HERIBERT JONE, O.F.M. CAP., MoRAL THEOLOGY
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laudable the motive and how beneficial the consequences, the act is not permissible. For example, deliberate blasphemy is never permissible, because the
object of such an act violates an eternal value which must be preserved un14
conditionally.
This traditional view seems also reflected in the common law, Which distinguishes between acts which only attract liability by reason of motives,
circumstances, or consequences and acts which attract liability regardless
of these. The criminal law appears to draw this sort of distinction between
offenses against the person and offenses against property. Although the
former admit of such defenses as self-defense, there seems to be an overall
limiting factor in that the deliberate killing of an innocent (i.e., known to
be innocent) victim is never allowed, no matter how great the necessity or
how noble the aim (deliberately to kill an innocent person is murder even
though perhaps the deceased's life is such a burden to him that death comes
as a merciful release1 5 ) ; for here the law adopts Aristotle's maxim that the
citizen is not allowed to be wiser than the law and substitute his own notions
of right and -wrong for the rules fixed by law. Contrast offenses against
property, where such definitional terms as "unlawfully," "maliciously," and
"fraudulently" allow for the taking or destruction in cases of necessity of
16
the property even of innocent persons.
In the eyes of the law an innocent life is something which can never be
subordinated to other considerations, whereas property rights may have to
give way to more important claims. Nor is this unreasonable, because in
theory at least one can always obtain or be given other property to compensate for what was lost, whereas life once taken cannot be restored. Likewise, the law of tort distinguishes between acts which are tortious regardless
of the defendant's motive and those which are in themselves indifferent but
17
which can become torts by reason of his malice or improper motive.
14 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 55.
15 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW ch. 8; pp.

311-350 (Ist ed., New York, 1957). This is not to say that necessity could never be a defense to murder, but there is a lack of clear authority on the extent to which it could operate.
Most of the situations where it is suggested that necessity would avail concern not the deliberate, intentional killing of one person as a means to some further laudable end, but rather
the deliberate performance of an act which (a) will cause death and (b) will achieve a laudable end; and here the death is neither intended nor in itself the means to the end - the
means is the act itself.
is On necessity and larceny see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW (The General
Part) s. 231, s.236 (2nd ed.).
17 STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (London, 1955) ; SALMOND ON TORTS 31 ff. (11th ed.

by R.F.V. Heuston, London, 1953). This distinction between acts which incur liability regardless of motive and those which do so by reason of motive is of course different from the distinction between crimes requiring mens rea and offenses of strict liability. The latter offenses
dispense not only with motive but with intention also; whereas in the former, intention is
always, but motive only sometimes, relevant.
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Trespass to land and conversion of chattels make little allowance for motive;
nor indeed could they, for if they did, the common law would have no effective means of establishing title to land and goods. Malicious prosecution,
defamation in certain circumstances, and certain kinds of nuisance on the
other hand are actionable only if the defendant has acted from some unlawful
motive. The law of tort also reflects a difference between acts wrong in
themselves and acts wrong by reason of their consequences, distinguishing
between torts such as trespass and libel which are actionable per se and torts
like nuisance, deceit, and slander which are in general actionable only on
proof of damage.' 8 Similarly the law of contract appears to take note of
the difference between acts which are and acts which are not intrinsically
wrong. Though the rules of English law relating to illegal contracts are an
amalgam of different principles, the courts have drawn a distinction between
the total illegality of agreements to commit wholly wrongful acts such as
crimes, frauds, and sexually immoral acts, and the less than total illegality
of agreements which are wrong solely by reason of detriment to the cornmunity, e.g., contracts in restraint of trade. 19
Now of course the fact that common sense, Christian teaching, and the
common law endorse this distinction only raises a presumption in its favor;
it is not conclusive. In one way, to be sure, the claim that all acts are morally
indifferent per se could be made indisputable. This could be done by adopting
the kind of definition of an act advanced by Browne, Austin, and, later,
Holmes, according to whom an act consists of a willed muscular contraction.2 0 Accordingly if I shoot Smith dead, my act is the voluntary contracting
of my finger; this in itself is without any moral quality and attracts moral
and legal culpability solely from my intention to kill Smith, from the circumstance that my finger is on the trigger and from the consequence that
the contraction of my finger causes the gun to fire a bullet at him.
Now the advantage of such a definition is the precision which it substitutes for the vagueness of ordinary language, in which the word "act"
enjoys no such comparable exactness. In law there are two particular aspects
in which such precision would appear beneficial. First we need to be able
to state for jurisdictional purposes exactly where and when an act took place;
secondly we need to be able for substantive purposes to distinguish a man's
acts (his voluntary conduct) from bodily events less than acts (involuntary
behavior) since normally we wish to impute responsibility only to the former.
18 SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 20.
19 See CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, LAW OF CONTRACT 309 (4th ed., London, 1956).
2
O. W. HOLMES, THz COMMON LAw 45-46 (ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Cambridge,

Mass., 1963).
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On the face of it the "willed muscular contraction" theory will help to solve
21
these two kinds of problem.
In fact, however, it helps in neither case. Consider first the jurisdictional
problem. 2 2 If A standing in the territory of one state shoots and kills B, who
is standing in the territory of another, the questions that arise for the law
of each state are really questions of policy. For the one the question is whether
to exercise jurisdiction over a homicide begun within its territory but completed without; for the other it is the corverse, whether to exercise jurisdiction
over a homicide resulting in a death within the state's territory although the
killer acted from without. Argument can be advanced to suggest that one
state rather than the other should exercise jurisdiction, or that both should
do so. But such arguments will be based on considerations of maintaining
order, protecting the citizens, and preserving good interstate relations. The
least satisfactory way of settling such a question would be by deriving a conclusion from some such premise as the definition of an act. Indeed such
questions are not in practice solved by reference to such a definition, and
need no such theory. Moreover, solution on the basis of such a theory would
result in the same answer being given to a jurisdictional question about a
crime of dishonesty, as to a question concerning a crime of violence. Yet
policy may well require different answers in each case, since different considerations arise. Accordingly the "willed muscular contraction" theory is
here at best unhelpful and at worst could be an undesirable straitjacket.
If we consider the problem of involuntary behavior, we find the definition
equally unhelpful. The theory draws its strength from the fact that in any
act (in the less precise sense) there are certain parts about which the actor
cannot be a hundred per cent certain. To take the example of my shooting
Smith: I can never be sure that Smith will die from the shot, that the bullet
will actually hit Smith, or even that the gun will fire; for I know that any
or all of these things may fail to take place. At best I can only predict that
they will happen. But in that case how can I be said to have full control
over my act? Holmes's definition sets out to separate out that part of my
behavior about which I can be certain and over which I have control. He
finds this to be that narrow area where there is no incongruence between
the actual and the expected. Between the expected contraction of my finger
and its actuality lies no room for mischance; guns may misfire but muscular

21

See P. J. Fitzgerald, Acts and Involuntary Acts, in OxFORD ESSAYS

1-28 (ed. Guest, London, 1961).
22 SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 406 (11th ed.).
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contractions do not. But this is not true. 23 From experience we know that
very occasionally the muscular contraction fails to obey the will: numbness,
paralysis, or some other unusual condition may be the explanation. The
difference between the gun misfiring and the muscular contraction misfiring
is not one of kind but only of degree. Indeed the theory bids fair to lead to
the conclusion that the only acts which are fully under our control and com24
pletely voluntary must be acts with no physical element, i.e., mental acts.
Such a conclusion would be of little help to the lawyer, or the moralist, intent
on explaining the difference between involuntary behavior and conduct which
is not involuntary. The suggested definition turns out here too to be practically
unserviceable and theoretically disastrous. The answer to the practical problem is to be found by other methods. The theoretical problem of describing
what an act is will not be advanced by a theory which drives us ultimately
into a misleading picture of human conduct as the movements of an external
puppet controlled by the strings of an inner man.
Now the ordinary use of the word "act" is vague. But then so is all
ordinary usage: clear boundaries are not to be found outside technical disciplines. Again, ordinary usage has no theory of what an act consists of.
But then again this is true of all ordinary usage: theories are not to be found
in this territory. Ordinarily - i.e.., when we are not talking philosophy or
jurisprudence - the word "act" is used to cover both events constituting
acts for Holmes, e.g., intentionally contracting my finger, and acts in a wider
sense, e.g., killings, assaultings, and so on. Concede for a moment, however,
that only the former shall be called acts. Where then stands the question
whether acts are morally indifferent? Why, nowhere at all. For if this is
what is meant by "act" the question becomes trivial: of course they are indifferent, by definition. But note how the old question is not thereby answered
but arises in a new form. Suppose that the act is the contracting of the finger
and the rest of what happens is called the action. The question now is
whether all actions are indifferent per se morally and rendered good and bad
only by their further consequences. Why then not simply ask whether an
act in the ordinary wide sense of the word is rendered good or bad only by
its consequences?

23 See H.

L. A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 69 PROCEEDINGS OF

179 (1948-9). Reprinted in LooIC AND LANGUAGE (First Series)
(ed. A. G. N. Flew, New York, 1951). For criticism of ascriptivism see P. T. Geach, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 221 (1960).
24 See H. L. A. Hart, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in JUBILEE LECTURES 115 (Lon,don, 1960).
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
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This consequential view was advanced by Bentham 25 against the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. To the contention that
murder is an act wrong in itself but nonpayment of taxes is merely malum
prohibitum Bentham would reply that both are wrong, neither intrinsically
nor by virtue of legal injunction, but because of the evil consequences which
both produce.
Now in one sense his reply is at odds with the contention it seeks to
refute, since that contention is that certain actions are morally quite indifferent
but that because the law has forbidden them they have become wrong.
Bentham's argument that they are wrong by virtue of their harmful consequences cannot be universally accepted, because it may well be that some
mala prohibita are found on inspection not to involve pernicious consequences
at all. Suppose the legislator is wrong in his factual predictions: he may
impose a tariff on the import of certain goods in order to protect home
industries and so secure the common good of the community, but it may be
that such protective legislation is in fact inimical to the common good. Or
suppose he is perverse and seeks to outlaw practices whose consequences are
good, albeit regarded by him as bad: he may seek to set limits to academic
and scientific freedom because he considers that criticism of accepted beliefs
is always bad, whereas in fact healthy critical examination of our beliefs may
well be desirable. Given, however, that the legislator is neither obviously
mistaken nor clearly perverse and that his laws are all in fact enacted for
the good of society, could Bentham's argument now be right? Would there
now be really no difference between laws forbidding murder, rape, and
theft and laws forbidding the use of a radio without a license, the importation of a watch from abroad without payment of duty, and the driving
of a motor vehicle without insurance? Are both these sorts of act wrong
only because they result in harmful consequences, and is common sense
mistaken in drawing a distinction?
Now in judging acts according to their consequences it is clear that it
is not the actual consequences which are in point. First, as Kant pointed
out, an act is not wicked simply because of some unforeseen but disastrous
outcome. 2 6 During the Second World War a great number of combatants
25 Jeremy Bentham, The Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, 1 WORKS
193 (London, 1843).
26
The good will is not good because of what it affects or accomplishes or because of its
adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because of its willing, i.e., it
is good of itself and regarded for itself if it is to be esteemed incomparably higher
than anything which could be brought about by it in favour of any inclination or even
of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that by a particularly
unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature this will
should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish its purpose and if even the greatest
effort should not avail it to achieve anything of its end and if there remained only
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died from overdoses of morphia. It was standard practice to give any serious
casualty an injection of morphia, and many unfortunately received a second
injection from rescue parties unaware that a first injection had already been
administered. In such cases no one would claim that the action of such a
rescue party was immoral as well as unfortunate.
Quite clearly if consequences are relevant to the assessment of moral
worth it is those which are intended or foreseen which count. The question
then is whether there are any acts which are wrong despite the fact that the
performer intends or foresees good consequences which may outweigh the
anticipated harmful consequences.
Secondly, in discussing acts generally little difference need be made between intended and foreseen consequences. If mala in se such as killing and
stealing are wrong because of their consequences, it is both because of intended and because of foreseen consequences: the malefactor intends to deprive the victim of his life or property, and the likely consequences are clearly
foreseen. In an individual case, however, it may be vitally necessary to distinguish between the two. Suppose Smith is drowning and I rescue him
knowing that he is a thief who may cause society considerable havoc: it
may be that on balance his death would have been a greater benefit to society
than his survival, but so far as I am concerned these consequences are only
foreseen and it would be, to say the least, odd to take them into account in
evaluating my act. Even odder, of course, would it be to draw no difference
between his survival, which I do intend, and his continuing criminal career,
27
which I do not.
One way of reconciling Bentham's not unattractive argument with the
promptings of common sense is that of Austin, who, while accepting the
principle of utility, would argue that certain acts are so manifestly productive of harmful consequences that we look on them as much more grave
and evil than others whose consequences are less obviously pernicious.2 8
On this view we should expect every legal system to have laws prohibiting
acts like murder whereas we should not necessarily expect to find laws relating to driving without insurance. This restricted brand of utilitarianism
allows one to accept the view that the ultimate moral principle is that happiness ought to be maximized without also holding that the true test of the

27
28

the good will (not as a mere wish but as the summoning of all the means in our
power) it would sparkle like a jewel in its own right as something that had its full
worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitfulness can neither diminish nor augment this
worth. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OP MORALS 10 (tr.
Lewis White Beck, 1959).
See G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, PHILOsOPHY 1, 11 (1958).
Austin's Lectures (5th ed., New York, 1875) lecture xxv, p.- 4 8 4 ; lecture xxxii, p. 289.
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morality of each individual action is its tendency to maximize happiness. 29
As Austin observed,
.. .we must not consider the action as if it were single and insulated,
but must look at the class of actions to which it belongs. The probable
specific consequences of doing that single act, of forbearing from that
single act, or omitting that single act are not the objects of the inquiry;
the question to be solved is this: if acts of the class were generally done
or generally forborne or omitted what would be the probable effect upon
the happiness or good?
Considered by itself a mischievous act may seem to be useful or
harmless, considered by itself a useful act may seem to be pernicious.
For example if a poor man steals a handful from the heap of his rich
neighbour the act considered by itself is harmless, or positively good. One
man's poverty is assuaged with the superfluous wealth of another.
But suppose that thefts were general (or that the useful right of
30
property were open to frequent invasions) and mark the result.
On this view the principle of utility is an overall principle by which we
judge of classes of acts and from which we can derive more specific rules of
conduct such as "do not kill" or "do not steal"; and in considering the rightness or wrongness of an individual act we may not in general invoke the
principle of utility but must rely on the rules derived therefrom. If, having
promised to do something, I ask, "Why should I do this?" the answer, "Because you promised," is sufficient to close the argument. To proceed further
and ask why promises should be kept is a different enquiry concerning the
social rules and institutions derived from the general principle of utility.
This restricted brand of utilitarianism regards the reasons relevant to the
criticism and justification of individual actions and those relevant to the
criticism and justification of social practices and rules as not necessarily
identical. An outstanding example of this distinction is afforded by the case
of Socrates, who, though unjustly condemned to die, refused to escape and
avoid execution, because this would have been to ignore his duty of respecting
the verdict and sentence of the court: considerations of consequences were
not relevant to the question of escaping but only to that of accepting or
repudiating in general the Athenian constitution and moral code. 3 1
Adopting this restricted utilitarian approach, we could now distinguish
29 For a discussion of Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism see R. A. WASSERSTROM,
THE
JUDICIAL DECISION 118-137 (Stanford, Calif., 1961).
0
AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED

H. L. A. Hart, New York, 1954).
31 S. TOULMIN, THE PLACE OF REASON

IN ETHICS

151 (1953).

38-9 (ed. with intro, by
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mala in se and mala prohibita in two different ways. First, mala in se are
as a class so pernicious in their consequences that general moral rules forbidding them are easily derivable from the principle of utility.3 2 By contrast
mala prohibita are not so self-evidently pernicious, and in their case morality
provides no prohibitory rules to accompany those imposed by law. Accordingly the existence of general moral rules forecloses the possibility of evaluating
any individual malum in se by reference to its consequences, whereas the
absence of such rules leaves us to assess an act which is not malum in se
(which may or may not be legally prohibited) by reference to its consequences.
Nevertheless, as society changes, the evil tendencies of such an act in general
might become more obvious, with the result that the principle of utility
might well give rise to new moral rules prohibiting it and transforming it
from malum prohibitum into malum in se. It is possible that, in a community
where road accidents are frequent and insurance usual, noninsurance could
become so manifestly undesirable as to make insurance demanded by some
moral rule. Here justice would seem to demand that those who undertake
an activity fraught with danger to others should ensure that they can, if
necessary, compensate their victims, and the duty of insurance would seem
inherent in the status of road-user. Or, to approach the matter from another
angle, it might be argued that in a community where everyone insures and
the law enjoins insurance, other citizens expect me to insure just as they
expect me to honor my promises; and insurance, like promise-keeping, becomes not so much a duty as an obligation. Or again it could be contended
that from the principle of utility there can be derived (if you think it needs
to be derived at all) the principle that one should not reap an unfair advantage
over others by accepting all the benefits of society while avoiding all the
burdens. To enjoy the benefit of others insuring while not oneself insuring
is to gain just such an unfair advantage.
There is, moreover, another distinction, not always glimpsed by the
utilitarian approach, between mala in se and mala prohibita. The former
are forbidden by rules which are fundamental in a way in which rules about
taxes, import duties, and motor insurance are not. 3 3 Even if the above discussed rule about insurance came to be looked on as a moral rule, it would
hardly seem a fundamental one. With such fundamental rules as those
forbidding killing and stealing and so on we can contrast (a) what may be
called neutral rules, e.g., the rule of the road, where some rule is necessary
32 J. S. Mill in fact considered that the legal subordination of one sex to another wrong
in itself: THE SU1JECTION Or WOMEN (1869) cited by Marcus G. Singer, .Moral Rules
and Principles, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 189 fn. 15 (ed. by A. I. Melden, 1958).
s3 For this distinction between fundamental, neutral, and local norms see Singer, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 176 ff.
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34
but where no particular version of the rules is to be preferred to any other;
and (b) local rules, e.g., rules concerning taxes and other matters which are
dependent upon local social conditions. 35 Both neutral and local rules, as
we should expect, vary from society to society. Fundamental rules, however,
in essence if not in detail, are invariable and indeed seem to be the preconditions of any society. A society in which there were no acceptance of the
notion that killing and other forms of violence are wrong would hardly qualify
as a society at all.
Fundamental rules differ from neutral and 'local rules in yet another
respect. They forbid acts which violate the rights of some determinable individual or group of individuals, whereas neutral and local rules forbid acts
36
which do not necessarily involve harm to any obviously assignable victim.

For example, murder violates the right of one particular deceased; driving
without insurance or the nonpayment of taxes does not necessarily violate
the rights of any particular member or members of society, but only of
society as a whole. Any offense of violence not only causes alarm in the
community but also involves injury to one specific person. Offenses created
by neutral or local rules, however harmful to the community at large, lack
this immediately injurious effect. If we inquire why crimes with assignable
victims are worse than those without, two answers suggest themselves. First,
the suffering of the actual victim of the first type of crime may well be enormous, whereas the second type of crime imposes on the community a burden which, however large, can be spread and which therefore falls only
slightly on each individual. Secondly, the feeling that crimes injuring specific victims are worse than crimes injuring the community only is connected
with the view that society exists for its members and not vice versa. In a
society aiming to provide a satisfactory life for its members one of the first
targets should be to eradicate just those offenses which make individual life
insupportable. Thereafter society can look to offenses against itself: society
is large enough to look after itself; the individual is not.
Because of these differences mala in se appear much more obviously
wrong than mala prohibita. Murder is more wrong than driving without
insurance or nonpayment of taxes, partly because these harm only society
34 Cf. "Such rules are neutral because it would make no moral difference if their opposites
were adopted" and "The characteristic of a neutral norm is that the same results would
have been attained by adopting precisely the opposite, while it is necessary to adopt some
rule." Singer, ibid.
35 Examples of two different local rules regarding the same problem are the two systems
of water land in the United States, the riparian and the appropriation. Singer, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 181-82, citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF LAW 118-119
(New Haven, Conn., 1924).
36 See Singer, op. cit. supra note 32, at 190.
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whereas murder harms a particular person as well, and partly because if
everyone committed murder all the time the consequences would be far more
disastrous: society would become impossible in a way in which a society without taxes and motor insurance is not. It may be difficult to find or establish today a society without taxation, but such a society is not inconceivable;
certainly societies without compulsory motor insurance are, unfortunately,
in existence. A society whose members continually committed murder would
be impossible not only in the sense that it would not work but in the sense
that such a state of affairs would not count logically as a society. Part of
the notion of a society is just the absence of this sort of behavior.
At this point one might still argue that mala in se are nevertheless wrong
because of their consequences, one of which is the injury to the actual victim.
But by now the claim has become rather odd: murder is wrong because one
of its consequences is that the victim dies! Yet the idea implicit in the consequentialist claim was that sometimes the other more general consequences
can outweigh this particular immediate harm. The consequentialist claim is
by no means self-evident. Certainly it is no more compelling than the contrary view that the wrongness of certain acts is never outweighed by the
beneficial nature of their remoter consequences. Each view seems to rest on
a principle which is accepted rather than proved. The very contention that
acts are not intrinsically wrong rejects one value judgment and substitutes
another; it must maintain that certain consequences are intrinsically wrong,
unless it is to result in an infinite regress.
Now the attraction of utilitarianism is that it provides a reason for claiming acts to be wrong whether they are mala in se or mala prohibita; and the
opposition to the traditional distinction may well result from dissatisfaction
with the idea that acts may be wrong for no reason at all. To say that killing
is wrong not for any reason but just intrinsically is hardly satisfactory, though
this might be obscured by our general acceptance of this proposition and by
the obviousness of the reasons that support it. But suppose someone were
to assert that whistling is wrong and refuse to proffer any reason for this
statement: what sense could this make and what should we understand him
to mean?
But if utilitarianism provides a reason for the rightness and wrongness
of acts, it by no means provides the only or even the best reason. One could
equally well advance others, such as that God has so ordained or that certain
acts are in accord with or contrary to the needs of human nature. This is
not the place to examine these or any other alternative systems in any detail.
It may, however, be remarked that the utilitarian principle and the principle
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of divine command are superior to a principle based on the needs of human
nature in one respect, namely that they have a unifying simplicity not obvious
in the multiplicity of human needs and desires. And over the divine command
principle utilitarianism has a superiority which is both apparent and real. Its
apparent superiority lies in substituting for the ipse dixit of authority a rational
principle immediately acceptable to the human mind. That someone has
forbidden such and such an act seems a less convincing reason for holding
it to be morally wrong than does the fact that it is likely to maximize suffering.
This, however, is to misunderstand the nature of a divine command ethic, by
regarding "God has ordained" as analogous to "Smith has said," whereas the
vital feature of the former statement is that God's nature is considered such
that whatever He says is right: it is because it is right that God has commanded
it and not vice versa. Hence, of course, the importance for moral theology of
a full synthesis with dogmatic theology. 37 Utilitarianism does, however, have
real superiority in one respect, namely that reliance on divine command
depends on belief and revelation, which have not been vouchsafed to all.
In a sense, however, there is no conflict if the principle Of utility is regarded, as it was by Austin, as an index to the divine will. 3 8 The disadvantage of the complexity of an ethic based on human needs, is, of course,
outweighed by the fact that it gives far more concrete principles than the
single principle that happiness should be maximized. From human needs
and human nature one can work out the preconditions for the survival of
human life and for society.
T'his argument against the notion of intrinsically wrong acts, then, is less
than wholly insuperable. A restricted version of the consequence argument
allows for such acts, while the more extreme utilitarianism is found to depend
in any case on the acceptance of a value judgment which has no self-evident
superiority to the judgment that certain types of acts are wrong in themselves.
But this leads to the second ground on which the notion is open to attack.
II
IT IS SOMETIMES objected that the common law definitions of such typical

mala in se as murder and theft are clearly too artificial and too arbitrary to
denote acts which are wrong in themselves.3 9 If such crimes were intrinsically
wrong, their definitions would be obvious and they would be invariable from
state to state. This, however, is not the case. Some of the details of the
See BERNARD H.RING, 1 THE LAW OF CHRIST ch. 2 (1963).
3 AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 37 ff.
39 See [Notes], 72 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 318-19 (1956).
37
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definitions of murder and larceny in the common law are, to say the least,
far from obvious. Is dishonest borrowing, for instance, self-evidently outside
the scope of the moral wrong which larceny is supposed to enshrine? Again,
why is the criminal law of each state not identical as regards mala in se?
The answer to this objection is that while the real criminal law enshrines
moral principles, these are extremely hard to enclose exactly. Moral principles have a flexible and a subtle character adaptable to every possible nuance
and circumstance; rules of law operate in a cruder framework and must often
draw hard and fast lines in the interests of practical necessity. As Devlin
observes, the law must trim the edges; it may build a citadel to protect the
sanctity of life but this will not be exactly coterminous with the moral principle, for the architecture of the law runs in straight lines. 40 That different
legal systems should trim the edges differently and draw slightly different lines
around their citadel is no matter for surprise.
In many cases, however, the differences are more radical than mere
discrepancies of detail. What is regarded as murder in one society is not
so regarded in another. One community may use the criminal law to protect private property while another may not even recognize this as an
institution. One legal system may impose a legal duty of rescue while another
may leave the citizen free to stand idly by without coming to the aid of
another. Further, even within one and the same country, moral views change
and with them the criminal law which reflects them. Heresy, witchcraft,
and attempted suicide, all once criminal offenses in England, are no longer
so today. Which moral beliefs, then, are the true ones-those prevalent
in Western societies or those elsewhere? Those now prevalent in England
or those prevalent in Blackstone's time? Surely, it is argued, all morals are
relative and there is no such thing as an act wrong in itself. "There is nothing
'4 1
either good or bad but thinking makes it so."

One reply to this argument is that in any society there will be a current
positive morality according to which certain things are wrong, quite apart
from any question of legal prohibition. If such acts are also prohibited by
law, then they are mala in se; where acts are prohibited by law only without
being contrary to current morality, they are merely mala prohibita. Recognition of this sort of distinction need not necessarily commit us to absolutism
42
in morals.
This, however, is too short a way with the objection. It is an undoubted
fact that rules of law are not always in harmony with those of current
40 Devlin, op. cit. supra note 2, at 5.
41 J. W. C. TURNER, MODERN APPROACH TO THE CRIMINAL LAW 220 (1948).
42 See P. J. Fitzgerald, Crime, Sin and Negligence, 79 LAw QUARTERLY RpviEw

(1963).
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morality, and a sensible legislator will strive to minimize the discrepancy
between them. If stealing is considered morally worse than speeding, he
will not set higher penalties for the latter than for the former. But the
bringing of law into accord with morality need not be a one-way operation
only. A wise legislator can use the law to enlighten and educate and so
bring current morality into sympathy with it. Now the relativist argument
that there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so suggests
that while moral beliefs must as a matter of practical policy be taken into
account, still such beliefs are accidental and may, like our views about architecture and other matters of taste, gradually change. Implicit in Devlin's
thesis and in the whole distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita
is the idea that-our moral beliefs are not contingent and that there is a real
difference between the two sorts of acts, a difference which both explains and
justifies the distinction made by common sense. If this is true, then a legal
system that disregards the distinction will be not only practically unsuccessful
but morally reprehensible.
We cannot ultimately escape the charge that the belief in the existence
of acts wrong in themselves presupposes some sort of moral objectivity. Now
to try to establish any such objectivity in ethics would be far outside the
scope of this article, which will merely suggest that denials of the possibility
of moral objectivity may rest upon a mistaken view as to the nature of moral
reasoning.
The idea that moral objectivity is somehow logically impossible arises
in the following way. Moral arguments differ both from factual disputes
and from disagreements over matters of taste. Unlike the former, moral arguments seem incapable of settlement by processes of verification and falsification. Unlike the latter, however, they appear to be not concerned just
with subjective feelings but with real arguments about objective matters.
A statement like "slavery is morally permissible" is not, it seems, completely
incorrigible in the same way as a statement like "coffee is a pleasant drink."
On the other" hand such statements are not, it seems, corrigible by reference
to objective criteria in the same way as statements like "bats have feathers"
or "smoking causes lung cancer." Yet, if such moral statements are corrigible, then they must be so by reference to some criteria, criteria presumably
to be found in certain fundamental moral principles, such as that God has
so commanded, that man's nature so requires, that such and such will maximize happiness, and so on. On such basic principles it is that different moral
systems may be built.
The difficulty, however, with any such criteria was made clear by the
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wedge which Hume was supposed to have driven between moral and factual
propositions. According to Hume, the former could not be deduced from
the latter. 43 If, for example, such and such an act is productive of happiness,
is in accordance with divine command, or is in conformity with human needs,
it does not necessarily follow that we ought to do it, unless there is some
general ethical proposition to the effect that anything which is productive
of happiness, is in accordance with divine command, or is in conformity
with human needs ought always to be done. For ought propositions can only
be deduced from other ought propositions, but no ought proposition is selfevident.
Hume's wedge, as we know, has driven some to an intuitive theory of
ethics and led others to abandon the notion of objectivity in morals. Yet
surely the assertion that propositions like "if this act is one divinely ordained, then I ought to do it" are not necessary truths like those of logic
and mathematics, prompts the reply "who in the world ever imagined that
they were?" Of course such propositions are quite unlike such statements
as "if ABC is a triangle, it has three sides." Statements like this are true
independently of all empirical fact and can be neither established nor refuted
by evidence. This is because we so use the word "triangle" that to have
three sides is part of what being a triangle consists in. Accordingly if someone says, "here is a triangle with more (or less) than three sides," we know
at once that this cannot be true, not because the world does not contain
non-three-sided triangles but because the expression "triangle without three
sides" is allowed no application within our linguistic framework; it describes
no possible situation because we do not permit it to do so. But if this is so
and this is the usual modem philosophical account - then statements like
"if ABC is a triangle, then it has three sides" tell us nothing about the world
but are true in every possible situation. The only information such a statement could give us would be information about how the words in it are
being used, but this we know already.
Clearly moral propositions are quite unlike this. "If this act is divinely
43

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark'd that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning,
and establishes the being of a God or makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with
an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the
last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how
this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from
it. DAVID HuME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (ed. Selby-Bigge, London, 1960)
bk. 3. 1. 1 (p. 469).
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ordained, then I ought to do it" purports at least to provide information,
and moreover information not confined to the meanings of the words employed. Nor indeed would we have it otherwise. What use would there be
in moral statements that provided no information about what is good and
evil, what right and wrong? If moral statements were necessarily true, they
would all be of the same type as "wrong actions are actions which one ought
not to do"; i.e., they would be tautologous.
But if moral reasoning is not deductive, how, we are tempted to inquire,
can it be valid? Now of course the paradigm case of validity has always been
the deductive type of reasoning, so that any kind of argument, such as moral
argument, that falls short of this cannot, it seems, be fully valid. Accordingly
philosophers have sometimes lamented that morals lack that ultimate validity
to be found in logic and mathematics. Yet does it really make sense even
to wish that moral reasoning were valid in this kind of way, to criticize it
as in some way falling short of this ideal?
Much the same mistake was made about the inductive reasoning of
science. 4 4 For the scientist too is faced with a gap, a gap between the
observed and the unobservable. The fact that a phenomenon has always
occurred given certain conditions is no absolute guarantee that given the
selfsame conditions tomorrow the identical phenomenon will take place. So
here too we have a gap which cannot be bridged. All the same, to regret that
this is the case, to grieve that induction is not deduction and to lament the
impossibility of "proving" the truths of science is surely an error. For if scientific laws were deductive in character, they would provide no factual information. Meanwhile inductive processes work and are useful. And meanwhile
it seems eminently reasonable to use them. If asked, "Is it reasonable to use
induction?" we should answer, "What else would you have us do?" This
type of reasoning has its own type of validity.
But if this is true of scientific argument, may not the same hold good of
morals? May not this too have its own sort of validity? Of course "I promised to do x"' does not entail "I ought to do x"; but it does provide very
good reason for saying that I ought to do it. But is it a good kind of reason
really? Well, what other sort of reasons could there be? All moral reasons
will be factual statements like this, e.g., God has so ordained, human nature
so requires, and this will maximize happiness. And if this is not a reasonable
way of arguing, what other kinds of arguing are desired? 45
Just because fact statements do not strictly (in the sense of logical entailment) imply moral propositions, we must not jump to the conclusion that
See TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 31, at chs. 7 and 8.
45 ToULMIN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 162.
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Moral proposithey have no bearing on moral propositions whatsoever.
tions can be derived, though not deduced, from factual premises. If an act
has certain factual characteristics, then there is a prima facie case that it is
wrong. If an act is liable to maximize happiness, it is reasonable to conclude
that it would be a good act. Now this suggests a solution to the problem raised by the fact that different persons and peoples have had different moral views. Suppose a man agrees that certain conduct involves
the wanton infliction of pain on another and that in this case there is no
contrary comideration to justify such infliction of pain, but nevertheless
will not concede that there is anything wrong in persisting in such conduct.
Suppose he says, "But I like inflicting pain: why shouldn't I hurt people?"
Now we feel that if ethics has any validity and any value at all, then we
should be able to convince him that he is wrong. Of course, we can point
out to him that in general an act endowed with this property is said to be
wrong and so one that ought not to be committed. Perhaps we may show
that to contend that such an act is not wrong, even though it involves hurting
others, is at least logically odd and even possibly logically impossible. But all
this will not force him to stop doing it. But then, of course, "to show that you
ought to choose certain actions is one thing: to make you want to do what
you ought to do is another."' 47 A man in whom self-interest is so dominant
that he is not convinced by any ethical argument is unreasonable, and it is a
mistake to think or hope that any reasoning could convince the unreasonable.
But where whole societies take opposite views about right and wrong
it is less easy to talk of unreasonableness and corrupt minds. Many such
disagreements, however, may be based on different beliefs as to matters of
fact. Eskimo belief in a duty to kill off one's parents in their prime of life
was based on a belief that the dead entered the next life in the same condition in which they left this one, so that to let one's parents linger on to a
feeble old age appeared to be utterly wrong. Clearly Christianity involves
belief in a whole set of facts, e.g., original sin and eternal destiny, which will
differentiate the Christian's moral judgments from those of the non-Christian, e.g., the atheist, whose range of facts extends only to this life. On the
other hand, while there is here a disagreement as to what facts to accept,
there may be little or no argument as to moral attitudes based on shared
beliefs of fact. Whether communities could share the same factual beliefs
and differ entirely in moral outlook seems doubtful. In all societies there
seem to be accepted certain fundamental norms proscribing violence, dis"See Huoo MEYNELL, SENSE, NONSENSE AND CHRISTIANITY 22 ff. (1964)
extended treatment of this approach.
47 TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 163.

for a more

NATURAL LAW FORUM
honesty, lying, and certain other types of behavior; and while the detailed
application of such norms may vary, the underlying rules in broad outline
appear the same. But this should cause no surprise, because such fundamental rules provide the necessary conditions of any social life, the preconditions of living in a community at all. And mala in se are acts which violate
these fundamental rules. Anyone who will not agree that violence, dishonesty,
and lying are wrong, whether or not the law prohibits them, must surely
be convicted of having a corrupt mind.
III
THESE CONSIDERED objections to the view that certain acts are wrong in
themselves are not, it is submitted, insuperable. The question now arises
whether an act which is originally indifferent but which is forbidden by
law can still be regarded as morally indifferent. Once an act is forbidden
by law, does it not now become immoral to perform it? It may be malum
quia prohibitum but it is still malum. "In divine as in human law, some
things are commanded because they are good or forbidden because they
are evil. Others again are good because they are commanded or evil because
they are forbidden. '' 48 In other words, how do we reconcile Devlin's commonsense plea that there is nothing morally wrong in disobeying minor
regulations of the quasi-criminal law with the fact that one has a general
duty to obey the law? If one is morally bound generally to obey the law,
must one therefore obey every fussy legal regulation?
To establish on natural grounds that the individual ought morally to
obey the law is no sirple matter. Some philosophers consider obedience to
law as a moral obligation, others regard it rather as a duty. The distinction
drawn by moral philosophers between obligation and duty is that obligations
are created primarily by a man for himself, the typical example being promising, whereas duties are owed by a man to others by virtue of his station
or position. 4 9 Now the social contract theory would make respect for law an
obligation, based, of course, on a fictitious contract or agreement. Nor is this
analogy between promises and the citizen's relation to the law without point,
especially in democratic societies where government by consent is the rule
and where it is possible, legally at any rate, to withdraw from the state and
its legal system and start a new life elsewhere; and certainly anyone who
does take up residence in a new country is in a position similar to one joining
a club, who promises impliedly to abide by the rules.
48
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This account, however, of why one should obey the law is of only limited
application. In many countries governments rule without the consent of
the governed, and the citizen is not free to leave the country and opt out of
his society. Yet even in such countries obedience to law seems morally necessary. The most fitting explanation would seem to be that the fact that one
ought to obey the law is a moral duty, a duty owed to others by reason of
one's station in life. Much as the servant owes a duty to his master, the child
to his parents, and the pupil to his teacher, so the citizen can be said to owe
a duty of obedience to the sovereign. This view too has its attractions, especially when it is remembered that many modern societies developed from a
feudal system under which the tenant owed duties of allegiance to his lord,
who in turn owed reciprocal duties of protection to his tenant. It harmonizes

also with the traditional Christian view that all authority comes from above
and has to that extent a title to obedience. One shortcoming of this approach,
however, is that it fails to account for customary law, which is important not
only in quaint survivals, but also in commercial practice, international law,
and above all in the fundamental rules of constitutional law. The rule in
England that Parliament is sovereign is itself a customary rule which was
not, and could not logically be, enacted by any Parliament. In countries with
written constitutions the grundnorm that the constitution must be obeyed
must surely be just such a customary rule of law.
The inadequacy of both these theories suggests that the fact that one
ought to obey the law must be derived rather from a general moral principle.
One possible moral principle would be that human welfare needs human
societies, and human societies cannot function without law. Alternatively
one can seek some other moral principle such as the principle of utility. But
any such principle will roughly lead to the same standpoint that obedience
to law is something required by the common good.
If law observance is based on a moral principle, the question arises how
far total obedience is required. Clearly, not all individual rules and regulations
necessarily carry with them this general title to obedience. Traditional natural
law thinking recognizes two kinds of law disobedience to which is permissible.5 0
First, if a law is enacted by a usurper or by someone without any right to be
obeyed, then one is not morally bound to obey, because such an edict, not proceeding from the lawful ruler or sovereign, would not be law at all. In due
course, however, if the usurper's position became well established, the common
good might now require obedience to his decrees; in other words, the usurper
50
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would have now become the sovereign. Secondly, a law which is unjust
need not be obeyed, because being contrary to natural law it would not be
law at all but a mere abuse of law. Here a distinction must be drawn between
laws which command that evil acts be done, e.g., laws ordering the commission of murder, adultery, etc., and laws which, though not ordering evil
acts to be done, make unjust demands upon the subject, e.g., laws imposing
excessive and unfair taxes. The former type of law may on no account be
obeyed; the latter are not binding morally, except that the greater good of
preserving the general order in society may outweigh the individual good
and demand that they be obeyed. Apart from these two exceptions, Aquinas
would teach that one is bound to obey the law.
Now the "fussy regulations" with which Devlin is concerned fall into
neither of these categories. They are neither intrinsically unjust nor unjust
in their demands. Indeed some of them may have a general moral basis, on
which a legal superstructure has been built for different reasons. Sometimes it
is difficult to enclose a moral principle, and so the law "builds an outpost
against the direction from which it thinks danger is most likely to come." 5 1
On the ground that it would be wrong for children to be exposed at too early
an age to certain stimulants such as alcohol, the law not only prohibits the sale
of this to children but goes further and makes it an offense to allow a child
into a licensed bar at all. "The law prevents the enemy from getting anywhere near his objective; it means that he must be denied admission to territory where he could go without any moral offence at all." Here there is
something analogous to the Jewish notion of putting a hedge around the law
to keep people at safe iistance from forbidden ground through the invention
of additional restrictions, in the belief that if they do not break these latter
52
they will never break the law itself.

Sometimes the regulations are more by way of detailed applications of
a basic moral principle. Indeed the moral foundation of much of the quasicriminal law may be found in some broad principle to the effect that an
individual should not seek his own well-being without any regard for others'
and that in striving to profit himself he must be careful not to injure his
fellows. Accordingly many of these technical offenses, whether aimed at moral
or economic targets, are based on a general principle that it is immoral to break
the rules of society and gain an advantage at the expense of others who
keep them.
In this area of law too, therefore, the legislator enacts regulations whose
51 Devlin, op. cit. supra note 2, at 5.
52 J.L. Montrose, Broom v. Morgan and the Nature of juristic Discourse, 6 REs
JUDrCATAE 411 (1954).
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ends are ultimately concerned with promoting the common good. Now whereas in the case of "real" crimes the judgment of the state and of the citizen
as to the proper end and the appropriate means to this end coincide, in the
case of the quasi-criminal law they may diverge in more than one way. Both
citizen and legislator may be at one as to the end but at odds as to the means
best calculated to achieve it. An efficient transport system may be a goal
commending itself to both, but the citizen may doubt whether the vehicle
licensing procedure adopted by the authorities is geared to produce such
efficiency. In such a case, where he will in all probability lack the time and
expert knowledge at the disposal of the legislator, the citizen will be prepared
to give authority the benefit of the doubt, and, deferring to its wisdom, observe
even laws which strike him as foolish. He will do this also where, though
he disagrees with the legislator as to the means adopted, he recognizes that
there is room for more than one view on the matter and that if a choice must
be made then it is for the legislature to make it. In other cases he may have
extremely good reasons for believing - being perhaps an expert himself that the regulations in question are absolutely futile and incapable of procuring the desired end.
The citizen's disagreement may, however, relate to the ends themselves.
He may, for instance, dispute the notion that the end aimed at by the legislation is desirable. The welfare state, for example, might not commend itself
to every citizen as an end intrinsically good. Here again, however, the common good would seem to demand that the choice be left to the state, for
this is the only method of solving such problems which is justifiable in a
democracy and perhaps feasible in any state. But suppose the dispute over
ends is more crucial than this. In Chandler v. D.P.P.5 3 the appellants were
convicted of conspiring to break section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911
by entering a prohibited place for "a purpose prejudicial to the safety or
interests of the state." In fact they had planned to demonstrate at an Air
Force Station against nuclear weapons, their immediate purpose being to
immobilize the base. Their argument was that it would be beneficial to
Great Britain to give up nuclear armament; but they were not allowed to
call evidence to establish this, and their conviction was upheld. In such a
conflict the citizen may think the outcome too serious to be left to a counting
of heads, and there may come a point at which respect for the constitutional
procedures may be outweighed by the urgency of the danger.
Thirdly there may be a clash between the end aimed at by the state and
the legitimate aspirations of the individual citizen. A scientist, not engaged in
53 [1962] 3 All E.R. 142.
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military or other defense research, may be offered an attractive post in another
country, to which he is prevented from going by the legislation of his own
country which, anxious to prevent a "brain drain" but unable to do so by
paying sufficient remuneration, prohibits scientists from leaving for overseas
employment without official permission. Would this be an unjust law of the
first type under the natural law tradition? It surely involves no command to
do anything intrinsically wrong. Is it a law that makes unjust demands? In
wartime or national emergency it might well be conceded that the state has a
right to ensure that it is not deprived of the services of those essential to its
survival; and even in peacetime some would extend this principle to those
who work on defense and other secret projects of national importance. Is
the case of our hypothetical scientist so far removed from this? Yet one
may well feel that in his case the law is overstepping the limits: it is one
thing to lay down rules for those who are free (at any rate in a legal sense)
to leave their state, withdraw from their own legal system, and seek a new
life elsewhere; it is quite another to legislate that the subject may not legally
even withdraw and cease to be subject to the legal system itself. In this type
of case, where the offense would be malum prohibitum, the violation of the
rule does not seem necessarily to involve any immorality, and this could be
argued either on the basis that such a law would make an unjust demand
or on the ground that this was a matter in which the citizen was not really
subject to the legislator. This, however, will be a rare kind of situation.
More common are the others mentioned above, where disobedience to the
law seems less easy to justify.
Quite apart from the question of the coincidence of the judgment of
the state and the citizen, the quasi-criminal law differs from the real criminal
law in another respect. In real crimes, as we saw, the law may trim the
edges of the moral principles which the law enshrines. With technical
offenses too, insofar as they are based on some very general moral principle,
this is the case, but in much greater detail. From the general moral principle
that one should not harm others can be derived moral rules to the effect
that motorists should take care to avoid injuring others. But no general
principle can serve to lay down the precise measures which the motorist must
take in order to avoid such injury: morality leaves each case to be decided
on its merits. Law, however, does not operate in this fashion but proceeds
to prescribe the exact speed which must not be exceeded, the type of lighting
which the vehicle must satisfy, and so on. Likewise morality as well as ordinary
common law requires an employer to take reasonable care for the safety of
his employees. In England, however, the Factories Acts and the regulations
made thereunder have descended into a wealth of detail impossible to deduce
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from the general moral principle and particularizing extensively the duties
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of employers in different industries.
Now this wealth of detail is a natural phenomenon in law and serves
a highly important function. In the first place, law, unlike morality, cannot
deal with each individual case on its merits but must provide for the general
run of cases. This being so, law tends to lay down hard and fast rules, even
though they may not apply to every case with equal success. Secondly, in
law there is much to be said for having standards written down in black and
white rather than existing simply in the breasts of the judges, for if a precise
rule is written down then everyone knows where he is and so we obtain a
"government of laws and not of men."
Unfortunately such mass of detail, besides producing complexity, results
in undesirable rigidity. Situations may arise where the application of such
detailed regulations is totally unnecessary to the common good. To observe
the speed limit or to obey traffic signs is obviously necessary for the common
good under normal driving conditions, but in certain cases, e.g., on straight
deserted roads at times where all other traffic is absent, such observance, it
could well be argued, is totally inessential. Ideally the law would consist not
of detailed rules but rather of broad rules and possibly of detailed directives
which would suggest, without actually ordering, the precise measures thatshould be taken and which would accordingly leave room for liberal consideration of the individual case. To some extent we have this already. In
England the traffic legislation, detailed as it is, does not concern itself with
the actions and procedures of the driver himself. This is left to the highway
code, which lays down what the driver must do before turning across the
line of traffic, before overtaking, etc. But the code is not law, and transgression of the code constitutes no legal offense. 55 Its force is that transgression
may be an important factor to take into account in deciding whether a motorist has driven carelessly or dangerously contrary to the traffic legislation
itself. For instance, the rule of the road in England is laid down by the highway code and not by law. Consequently, to drive on the right-hand side of
the road is in itself no offense in English law. Except in very rare circumstances, however, to diverge from the code in this respect in contexts where
the rest of the traffic observed the code, would be dangerous driving and so
criminal. Likewise the Code of Practice for the Protection of Persons Exposed
to Ionising Radiation in Research and Teaching issued by the Minister of
Labour (1964) is hortatory rather than legally binding, though it would be
an extremely unwise university or college that disregarded it. Nevertheless
See Redgrave's Factories Acts (20th ed., 1962).
5 Road Traffic Act 1960. s.74 (4).
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the virtue of such codes and their advantage over the traditional method of
devising detailed rules of law is that they can allow for special treatment of
special cases. If all law adopted this character, the problem about mala
prohibita would disappear. As it is, the problem still arises over the "fussy
regulation": is the citizen obliged to obey in every detail these regulations
of the quasi-criminal law? Or can we reconcile the proposition that one is
obliged to obey the law with a certain flexibility allowing derogation in certain
situations?
One solution is provided by the theory of penal law. According to
this, rules creating technical offenses do not in fact oblige in conscience. The
legislator is deemed not to intend to bind the subject morally to obey this
type of law, but to leave him free to choose whether to obey the law or to
violate it and pay the prescribed penalty. The only moral obligation, it is
contended, is to submit to the just penalty for disobedience.5 6 A motorist, for
example, who violates the speeding regulations in some quiet deserted area
where there is no possible danger to anyone is devoid of moral blame. Should
he be caught, however, and convicted of such a violation, then he cannot
refuse to pay the fine imposed by the court without rendering himself guilty
of immorality. In normal traffic conditions, however, to exceed the speed
limit might involve moral wrong, though not by reason so much of the actual
violation of the regulation but in virtue of infringing the general moral duty
to have care for the safety of other road users.
This approach preserves a measure of flexibility from a moral standpoint and in essence reduces such regulations to codes like those instanced
above. It does, howe-,er, raise certain difficulties as it stands. 5 7 First, it
involves imputing to the legislature an intention which is difficult to substantiate. Secondly, it suggests that the legislature is competent, if it wishes, to
go further than to order and prohibit types of behavior; it suggests that it is
competent to oblige subjects in conscience; and this too is doubtful. Thirdly,
it suggests that there can exist laws which are not obligatory. And fourthly,
there is the difficulty of establishing that if a law is not morally obligatory
there can be a moral obligation to submit to a penalty for its infraction.
The third and fourth objections, it is submitted, are not wholly convincing. Of course, in one sense it is true to say that a nonobligatory law
5r DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 121.
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is no law at all, because law is a rule that is obligatory. So for the legislature to say "this is something which must be done, but there is no obligation
to do it" would be self-contradictory. But surely there is a difference overlooked by this objection between moral and legal obligation. Obviously all
laws are by definition legally binding. On the other hand surely we can
say that some laws may not be morally binding; surely we could argue that
a rule to the effect that one must under no circumstances drive in some
specified area at a speed exceeding thirty miles per hour involves a legal but
not a moral "ought."
Now if we look on positive human law as deriving its legal validity from
the moral principles of natural law, we may, it seems, be driven to conclude

that any law that is not immoral must be either morally obligatory or not
law at all. Certainly those who with Goodhart 58 regard law as consisting
of rules recognized as morally binding must take this view. On the other
hand if we approach the matter by asking what conditions are necessary
before we can say that a society recognizes a rule as legally obligatory, the
facts suggest that the requisite conditions are, first, that in this society there
should exist a habit of obedience to the rule, i.e., that there should be a general
practice of observance of the rule in question; and secondly, that in addition
to this there should also exist a general practice of using the rule as a standard of behavior so that deviations from the rule are criticized simply by virtue
of being against the rule, and of using the rule as a reason for doing what
the rule requires and for supporting demands that others do likewise. 59 If
there is a legal rule in a community that what the Ruler says is law, this
means that, first, the citizens by and large habitually do what the Ruler says;
and secondly, that they use what he says as a standard of behavior in this
manner, to criticize, justify, and support demands. In other words, they
will say "you ought to do such and such because the Ruler has so commanded."
Now is this a moral "ought," and if not, what sort of "ought" can it
be? Clearly it is not an instrumental "ought" such as is to be found in
statements like "If you want to know what the positivist theory of law contends, then you ought to read Austin." Must it then be a moral "ought"?
In one sense, perhaps, yes; law is undoubtedly necessary for the common
good and therefore there is a general moral obligation for societies to have
laws and for the citizens to observe them. But this does not mean that there
is any moral obligation to have one particularsystem of law rather than any
other.
58
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Natural law and utilitarianism are at one in that some law is necessary,
but neither tells us which; the choice of law is neutral. Accordingly a society
may be morally bound to observe some such rule as that what Parliament
enacts must be obeyed, without being morally obligated to this particular rule
itself. And the importance of this distinction is that since such basic rules
or grundnorms are necessarily outside the ambit of legislation, there is no
way of altering them by legislation. If they are to be altered, and there is
no absolute moral reason- why the rule about Parliament, for example, should
not be altered, this could only be done by adopting some new rule, and this
would entail deviation from the existing one. Were such basic rules morally
obligatory we could never with moral justification deviate from them, so
that, morally speaking, all constitutions save unjust ones would be immune
from change. The rule that what Parliament enacts should be obeyed, it is
submitted, is in England legally but not morally obligatory, in the sense that
there is no moral duty to continue forever to accept this as the basic constitutional rule. But if it makes sense to speak of this sort of rule as having
legal but not moral obligation, then the same, it is suggested, applies to other
legal rules. There is nothing logically impossible in the idea of a law lacking
absolute moral obligatoriness.
Likewise with the argument that if there is no moral obligation to obey
the regulation in question, then there can be no obligation to submit to a
penalty for violation. The argument is that if one is obliged to submit to
the penalty, then one must be guilty, whereas there is no guilt in disobeying
a law which one is not bound to obey. Here too the objection conflates law
and morals by identifyi-ig legal and moral guilt. Yet we have seen that even
so far as concerns mala in se law is cruder and more rigid than morality,
so that it is possible for cases to arise where legal and moral guilt may not
coincide, though within the framework of the law we must do the best we
can with our imperfect legal instrument. By contrast, the penal law theory
draws a valuable distinction between disobedience to a law and disobedience
to the law. The former, e.g., refusing to obey a particular regulation, can
be looked upon as a sort of passive resistance. The latter is tantamount to
setting the whole legal system and machinery of justice at nought, and this
is surely active contumely. Nor is this an unfamiliar distinction; it is one
well known within the civil areas of the common law. It is one thing to
commit knowingly and deliberately the tort of trespass to land; it is quite
another to continue to do so in the face of a court order enjoining me to
desist. It is one thing to violate the planning legislation by turning your land
into a caravan site without obtaining permission from the planning authority,
but quite another to persist in so doing contrary to a court injunction. Or
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again there is a vast difference between the motorist who breaks the law by
driving without a license and the motorist who continues to drive despite a
court order that he must not do so. 60 The former act, in each case, has
violated the law and is quite possibly morally culpable. The latter involves
not just simple violation of the law but contempt of court; the offender has
flouted the whole system of law, and this is something not only legally but
surely also morally much more reprehensible. This was the basis of Socrates'
refusal to escape and avoid the punishment set by law, even though that
punishment was unjust. On the penal law theory, it is arguable that though
disobedience to a minor regulation may not involve moral fault, refusal to
submit to the punishment set by law would be morally wrong, for it would
constitute just this rejection of the very instrument or institution of law.
The other objections to the theory, however, are more difficult to rebut.
The idea that the legislator intends not to bind in conscience but only to
prescribe a penal law is not really establishable on empirical grounds. There
is no question of actually inquiring of the legislator what his real intention
was. It might well be that, if asked, the legislator would say that of course
he meant to bind the citizen morally; he wanted his laws to be as strong as
possible. Moreover, from the wording of such technical regulations it is not
easy to gather that he had this limited aim. If someone in authority wants
to deter certain sorts of behavior, he can adopt different procedures. He
may make it difficult to perform the action, by laying down that if it is done,
certain other things have to be done. Suppose it is desired to prevent people
from driving without third-party insurance. The legislator may provide that
anyone applying for a license for a motor vehicle shall pay a substantial fee
but that if he can produce a certificate of insurance this fee shall be remitted.
In this case there would be nothing illegal or immoral in driving uninsured,
but practical expediency will lead most motorists to insure. Alternatively he
clould provide that motorists must either insure or pay a special fee. Here
again there would be nothing wrong in not insuring, but the legislator is
now ordering the citizen either to insure or to pay the sum; and to do
neither would be against the law. Finally he can do what is usually done:
he can provide that to drive while uninsured shall be an offense subject to
a penalty of such and such a fine. In this case the citizen is given no choice
at all, and uninsured driving is laid down as against the law. Now since
most regulations of the quasi-criminal law are of this nature, it is, to say
the least, odd to infer that in reality the lawmaker intended to allow a choice
60 Driving without a license is punishable with a maximum fine of £20 (Road Traffic
Act 1960. 2. 985); driving while disqualified, by a maximum prison sentence of six months,
and the court must imprison unless there are special reasons to the contrary. R.T.A. 1960
s. 110. (This has been altered by Road Traffic Act 1962.)
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and did not intend that the citizen be bound by the main limb of the regulation. It is odd simply because if this is what he had meant, he could so
easily have said so.
Still it could be argued that since the legislator cannot foresee all possible
cases and since he cannot, when an individual case arises, be asked his opinion,
it is for the courts and the citizen to try to spell out from the wording of
the regulation the real policy and intention of the law. Since courts are used
to interpreting laws according to their spirit and purpose, it is only reasonable
in a common law system to assume that laws are made against a background
and in a context in which such interpretation is operative. In other words,
even if we cannot ask the legislator for his intention, we can still try to extract
what he would have said had he been faced with the concrete situation in
question.
The most difficult objection to the penal law theory is that it suggests that
there is something which the legislator could do if he wished but which he has
chosen not to do, i.e., oblige in conscience, whereas this is something which
no human legislator is competent to do at all. For if an act is not morally
wrong, no ipse dixit of any human lawmaker can make it wrong. If driving
without insurance is morally indifferent, then no law requiring insurance
can make this immoral. What a legislator or anyone else in authority can
do is to issue a valid order, disobedience to which involves moral fault. This,
however, does not mean that to do what he has forbidden is wrong in any
other way than that it involves disobedience to a lawful order. In other
words he can say, "Do not drive without insurance." He cannot order that
"Driving without insurance is morally wrong." This is something which
no man may do. Men may only declare that certain things are wrong; they
cannot constitute them wrong by order.
The penal law theory is stating in a misleading way something that could
quite well be expressed unobjectionably in another manner. The claim enshrined in the theory is that in the case of technical regulations, while disobedience in general would be wrong, nevertheless it might not be morally
wrong in all cases. Generally disobedience would be wrong (a) because
in general one ought not to disregard the provisions of the law without good
cause and (b) because disobedience would probably involve an act in any
case detrimental to the common good. On the other hand there can be
good cause, and circumstances alter cases. In fact one is permitted to use
one's common sense. Where there is no possible harm involved in violating
the provision in a certain instance and where nonviolation might cause serious
inconvenience, then there would be nothing morally wrong in violation
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(though even here, anyone convicted would be bound to undergo a legally
just penalty for disobedience). Indeed the law itself often operates in this
way. The Road Traffic Legislation provides that it is an offense to cross a
double white line in order to overtake, and this like similar offenses is presumably one of strict liability. 6 1 Nevertheless if the vehicle in front had
broken down, common sense suggests that the rule could be disregarded
unless this would involve some danger. Here there would seem to be scope
for the defense of necessity. And if the law itself is subject to an overriding
requirement of reasonability in the circumstances, surely the moral position
is at least as flexible.
An alternative way of stating the position, preserving much of the good
in the penal law theory without some of the objectionable features, is that
the laws of the ruler have moral authority only insofar as he is exercising
his function of caring for the common good of society.6 2 Better still would
be to restate it in this way, that the citizen is morally obliged to obey any
law only insofar as the law in question promotes the common good. This
approach not only avoids the difficulties involved in the notion of the legislator's obliging the citizen in conscience but also extricates us from the problem
of trying to infer the presumed intent of the legislature. Instead we can examine each law on its merits and inquire whether it serves to promote the common good, and this allows for an application of the law according to the dictates of reasonability. Moreover, it is far more serviceable as regards a complex
legal system in which different parts of law have different origins, some being
the creature of legislation, others the result of judicial development, and
yet others the consequence of customary growth. In such a system it makes
little sense in many instances to speak of the lawgiver. Furthermore, this
approach has more relevance to a system of law such as obtains in England,
where there exists no rule for cessation of law by reason of obsolescence but
where rather "age cannot wither nor custom stale" a statute.6 3 Statutes
long since obsolete remain on the statute book, whose modernization is prevented by lack of Parliamentary time. To contend that such statutes are
no longer binding in conscience because the legislator never intended that
they should be in present circumstances is fictitious and artificial; more realistic is the suggestion that they no longer have this binding force because
they no longer fulfil the function of promoting the common good.
It is suggested, therefore, that a malum prohibitum need not necessarily
61 R.T.A. 1960 s. 14, and Highway Code para. 20.
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be a moral wrong, that disobedience to the quasi-criminal law can in certain
cases be morally permissible, and that this is not because such a law is unjust in either of Aquinas's senses (it neither commands evil nor makes an
unfair demand) but because the inherent inflexibility of law fails to allow
either for cases where a law no longer serves society well or for particular
situations in which observance of a particular law fulfils no useful purpose.
If the above arguments are right, there is nothing impossible either in
the notion that certain acts are intrinsically wrong (mala in se) or in the
idea that sometimes there is nothing morally wrong in the commission of
a technical legal offense. This does not entail, however, that we should adopt
the twofold procedural classification outlined by Devlin. We can agree that
mala in se, sins with legal definitions, acts contrary to fundamental rules,
ought, in order to reflect the seriousness with which they are viewed by the
citizen, to be punishable with more than nominal penalties; and that, therefore, the protection of the individual requires trial by jury. We can also
agree that many of the mala prohibita, technical offenses of the quasi-criminal
law, involve little if any moral blame and should accordingly carry only
minor penalties; and that for this reason trial by jury is probably inappropriate. We can go further than Devlin here, however, and suggest that
perhaps the best way of dealing with such matters is to substitute for strictly
legal regulation the kinds of codes of practice and behavior illustrated above.
But where Devlin's dichotomy breaks down, it seems, is in omitting the case
of the malum prohibitum which falls midway between the real crime and
the pure technical offense. For some of these, though not based on any fundamental moral norm, are nevertheless founded on some neutral or local norm.
In these cases no moral rule dictates the choice that a community must make,
but morality in general demands that some choice be made; and once the
choice is made, and society adheres to the norm, then obedience is clearly
required by the common good, just as violation runs counter to that good,
and may contravene the fundamental norm that one must not unjustifiably
cause harm to others. Though such offenses differ from real crimes in that
in rare circumstances their commission may involve little harm and therefore
little moral blame, on the whole they are too serious to be branded as trivial.
Accordingly, stronger than minor penalties may be necessary both to reflect
the seriousness with which common sense views them and to assist in educating public opinion to look on such offenses as significantly wrongful. One
of the difficulties with the law of road traffic is that so far public opinion
has not accepted that careless and dangerous driving is seriously wrong
morally. To leave such offenses to be visited with merely minor penalties
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will not help to educate the public to a proper sense of responsibility in this
regard. In this intermediate area jury trial is obviously necessary too if more
than minor penalties are to be awarded.
The objection to Devlin's enlightened approach, which draws new strength
from an old source, is not that it is fundamentally wrong. In fact it is fundamentally right; its defect is that it fails to take account of the complicated
area of mala prohibita which, though not real crimes in the strict sense,
merit more serious treatment than purely technical offenses.

